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This paper deals with the question of whether one can successfully
represent the meanings of generic sentences by a process of circum-
scribing the domain in some principled way so as to eliminate all ex-
ceptions. One such suggestion from the semantics literature is exam-
ined in some detail, and does not appear to result in a successfully cir-
cumscribed domain.
1. Preliminary comments
One of the more difficult semantic problems one might undertake is to formally
describe the truth-conditions of generic sentences. My present intention is not to
provide or even sketch a solution to this knotty problem, but rather to discuss the
overall structure of the problem in the form of a consideration of one potentially
attractive strategy for evaluating generics: what I will call 'reduction to the uni-
versal'. In the end I will cast some doubt on the viability of this strategy.
This basic idea, at least in a number of limited domains, is quite familiar—what
one tries to do is to set aside contrary or exceptional instances so that once the
domain of applicability is correctly defined, application will universally hold of
the domain. So, to take a simple example, if one has a generalization such as 'birds
fly', one wishes to fust somehow set aside all the non-flying things as not being
covered by the generalization, leaving flying birds alone as the basis of the gen-
eralization. Then, with respect to that chosen domain, the inference from 'Birds
fly' and 'Tweety is a bird' to the conclusion 'Tweety flies' will hold monotoni-
cally so long as Tweety is in the domain. The difficult part of this strategy is to ac-
complish this goal in some principled, non-circular manner.
2. Domain restriction
I take it that a generic sentence expresses a generalization or law which 'holds'
of a certain domain of the real world (or, more generally, some world of evalution).
I cannot at present be much more specific about what 'holds' means, but perhaps
slightly more technically we might say that 'holds' means 'is true with respect
to'. But I wish to be more specific about what a 'domain' of generalization is.
Generic sentences are, in the typical case, true (or false) with respect to a
given domain. Such a domain might be temporally restricted, as illustrated in the
examples of (1):
(1) a. In Roman times, workers were often paid with salt,
b. In the 1950's, women never wore blue jeans.
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c. During the Dark Ages, few people read books.
d. In the not-so-distant future, loan applications will be processed
in a matter of minutes.
However, the domain of generalization may be restricted in any number of other
ways, such as spatially rather than temporally, or in more abstract ways, as evi-
denced by examples such as those in (2).
(2) a. In the upper Midwest, people still wear polyester leisure suits (but
not in California)
b. In small families, children play alone much of the time (but not in
large families).
c. In English, syllable-initial voiceless stops are aspirated (but not in
Spanish).
d. In the Rochester schools, teachers are paid better than most
places (but not in Syracuse).
e. In contract bridge, bidding begins with the dealer and proceeds
clockwise around the table.
In each of these cases, a change in the domain-adverbial may result in a corre-
sponding change in the truth-conditions of the sentence. The limiting case of this
domain-sensitivity would be that of universal truths conditions which do not ap-
pear to vary with time or space or any other definable domain variation. Candi-
dates include certain truths of science, mathematics, logic, and so forth.
One of the central problems of generics, perhaps the central problem, is how
to treat the exceptions to the generics that typically arise. What I would like to do
in this paper is to discuss the extent to which the phenomenon of domain
restriction may be used as a device to set aside exceptional cases to such an ex-
tent that only the non-exceptional cases remain. So, to make our first simple ob-
servation, take Jacques, who is speaking French at the moment (and hence not
aspirating voiceless stops). We certainly do not take Jacques as then being an ex-
ception to the generalization expressed in (2c) because, at least when speaking
French, he does not fall within the domain specified by the phrase 'In English'.
Or, take the poorly paid teacher Mr. Smith, who works at a high school in Bos-
ton—we do not take him to be an exception to (Id), since it only applies to Roch-
ester teachers.
This illustrates how domains are expressed in natural language, but it is not
an analysis. In abbreviated form, here is the beginnings of an analysis. From the
perspective I take, sentences come in two basic varieties: (1) generic sentences,
which are true or false by virtue of the generalizations or laws they express, and
(2) episodic sentences, which are true or false by virtue of their correspondence
(or lack thereof) to the particulars that constitute our world. I take these particu-
lars to be things like token events and actions (though not the types), particular
times and places (e.g., last Sunday, but not Sundays), and manifestations of indi-
viduals and kinds (though not the kinds and individuals themselves). However,
things will be somewhat easier to illustrate if we make the simplifying assumption
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that times and places are the sole particulars-the 'locations' as expressed, for in-
stance, in situation semantics (e.g., Barwise and Perry 1983).
A domain of generalization is, then, any phenomenon describable in solely
episodic terms (this, then, includes things like Fido barked yesterday and Bob ate
a light breakfast this morning, but excludes things like Fido barks and Bob eats
a light breakfast on weekends). Translating to locations, a domain is any space-
time location (the portion of space-time where the episodics are instantiated, or
find their 'direct support'); these locations may of course be temporally and spa-
tially discontinuous, as in (2b, c, e) above.
If one regards generic sentences as inductively-based generalizations, then a
given domain will include just those types of instances from which the generaliza-
tion is derived. However, this is, I believe, an incorrect, or at least far too narrow a
view of what a generic generalization is. Rather, I prefer the perspective that
takes generics to be much more fundamentally like laws and rules (indeed, these
are expressed as generics). Let us take an example of a descriptive rule of a game,
for instance; say, in the card game of contract bridge, tens win over nines (i.e. are
higher-ranked than nines, higher-ranking cards 'winning' when played at the
same time as a lower-ranking card). Now, let us consider the status of this rule un-
der three different circumstances:
(1) A ten is played, a nine is also played (same suit, following suit lead, in
turn, etc.).
(2) A six wins over a five played at the same time (no tens or nines are laid
on the table at the same time).
(3) The bridge participants take a break and are playing a game of tennis.
I will assume that the situation in (1) is clearly in the domain, and that situation (3)
is clearly outside the domain. The question then arises about (2). Is this situation
within the domain or not? One could answer this both ways, I imagine. I prefer to
answer it in the affirmative (at least in principle), applying the following reason-
ing.
The entire body of the rules of a game determine how play may proceed, not
just a given rule in isolation. For instance, in chess it might well be that Queens
(unlike, e.g., Knights) take enemy pieces placed beside mem, and that is why I
don't move my bishop into such a location. Thus, the (potential) applicability of
a rule can have a hand, intensionally, in determining play. If the domain of appli-
cability were determined purely extensionally, and were identical to the domain
of application, then the rule should be as irrelevant to a situation where I move
my bishop to a location beyond the queen's reach, as the rules of professional golf
are to playing baseball. On this line of reasoning, (2) describes a situation that falls
within the domain of applicability by virtue of the fact that the participants are
playing bridge, and the rule's presence intensionally affects play.
I don't assume this settles the issue once and for all, but it does provide us
with a potential distinction: the domain of applicability vs. the domain of applica-
tion. I take the latter to be just those instances in which the rule (extensionally)
comes into play, and there is an episodic event of the type specified positively de-
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termining outcome (that is, when a generic sentence has an episodic counterpart,
the episodic 'holds'). It is another matter how to deal with mistakes and true ex-
ceptions—I assume any play in bridge with a ten and a nine in it falls within the
domain of application, even if the participants (so long as they are playing bridge)
fail to take note of a misplay; cases involving 'trumping' tens with nines, and so
forth, fall under 'exceptions'. Thus, to characterize the strategy of reduction to the
universal in somewhat different terms from those above, reduction to the univer- g
sal requires that the domain of application be identical to the domain of applica- |
bility less exceptions.
3. Structure of the generic problem
Above, I noted the use of explicit domain-restricting adverbs. But domain ad-
verbs are not the only way that the applicability of a generic is restricted. A re-
striction of sorts in fact appears to be part and parcel of the analysis of generic
sentences. Let us examine an approach that outlined in Krifka et al 1995, based
on work in Carlson 1988, Krifka 1995, and Wilkinson 1991. The basic observa-
tion is that a generic sentence consists of a relation that holds between the deno-
tations of two different parts of a sentence. In typical cases, these two parts are
the subject and the predicate of the sentence, as in (3), but in a wide variety of
other cases, the two parts expressing the denotations to be generically related
may be other constituents, as illustrated in (4).
(3) a. Cats/eat meat.
b. John/smokes a pipe
c. Everyone who eats at this restaurant/ returns for another meal soon.
(4) a. A bell goes off/ when you step on this floor mat.
b. Typhoons arise/ in this part of the Pacific.
c. A computer computes/ the daily weather forecast.
d. Coffee and muffins are served/ at 9 AM.
Many sentences, such as all those in (4), can have more than one plausible read-
ing corresponding to different divisions of the sentence.
Though the sentences are thus divisible into two components, the relation is
not symmetrical, since the components have different syntactic and semantic
properties. Syntactically, one component is a constituent (e.g., an NP, PP, adver-
bial phrase), and the other is whatever remains of the sentence once that con-
stituent is removed, reminiscent of quantificational representations with general-
ized quantifiers binding variables. Thus, we could enrich our representations in I
(3) and (4) not only to reflect the fact that a generic relation is being asserted of
the denotations of the two constituents, but also to reflect this syntactic asymme-
try. So, a 'logical form' for (3b) and, say, (4c), would be approximately as follows:
(3) b.' GEN (John(x)) (x smoke a pipe)
(4) c' GEN (the daily weather forecast(y)) (a computer computes y)
(A short note of interpretation: the sentence-like portion containing the variables
are to be interpreted episodically, though intensionally; things would be seman-
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tically clearer if a little inaccurate to render these portions in the progressive, 'x is
smoking a pipe' etc.). So this, then, is the sort of representation arrived at in
Carlson 1989. It does not say much about the semantics of GEN; in particular, the
corresponding asymmetries in the semantic interpretation remain uncharacterized.
Manfred Krifka managed to take this general analysis at least two steps fur-
ther. The first step consists of characterizing the roles of the two constituents
within a DRT framework, which was then extended to a situation semantics-
inspired form of representation. Consider the following recipe for representing
generics taken from Krifka et al 1995, though here represented in a slightly dif-
ferent form:
GEN[Xj...Xj; xk...x,] (Restrictor; Matrix) is true relative to
B[...{Xj}...{Xj}] if and only if there is an anchor f for the parameters of
B such that for every situation s which is of type B(f) it holds that if
Restrictor(f) is true, then f can be extended to f such that Matrix(f ) is
true.
I will talk some about the 'background' B shortly; here, the GEN operator is as-
sumed to be a 'default quantifier', whatever that cashes out to be in the end.
However, note the asymmetrical roles of the restrictor and matrix, in that the re-
strictor clause specifies the type of situation that must be extended by anchoring
additional parameters so that the matrix also holds. Let's look at a brief example
to illustrate.
(5) Hungry bears are attracted to beehives
(5') GEN[x,s; y](bear(x) & hungry (x) in s; x is attracted to y in s & bee
hive(y))
The Krifka-style truth conditions here say that, with exceptions, any situa-
tion where the variables x and s are anchored by f to entities verifying bear(x)
and hungry(x) in s, then there is some function f which extends f such that the
matrix will also be verified. What this boils down to, in this case, is that there must
be some entity anchorable to the parameter y which is a beehive that the hungry
bear is attracted to. So (5') is equivalent then to a formula in which existential
quantification over y is explicitly represented in the logical form itself, as in (5").
(5") GEN[x,s](bear(x) & hungry (x) in s; (3y [beehive(y) & x is attracted to
yins])
This, then, is one proposal which semantically characterizes the asymmetry be-
tween the two constituents of a generic. In subsequent work, Krifka takes the
additional step of trying to integrate the analysis of generics with a general the-
ory of focus, making use of the type of framework originally developed in Rooth
1985. This step is significant, I believe, since it is a principled attempt to motivate
the use of such representations on independent grounds. But let us return to a
fuller consideration of the structure of the recipe proposed above.
The restrictor clause, in this analysis, serves to limit the domain under consid-
eration in much the same way overt domain adverbs appear to. There is, in fact,
some suggestive evidence pointing to the idea that both cases, indeed, serve the
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same type of function. In many cases a domain adverb can be syntactically con-
verted into a noun-modifying phrase, though the result is synonymous with the
original. The examples of (6) are almost exact paraphrases of those of (2).
(6) a. People in the upper Midwest still wear polyester leisure suits.
b. Children in small families play alone much of the time.
c. Syllable-initial voiceless stops in English are aspirated.
d. Teachers in the Rochester schools are paid better than most
places,
f. Bidding in contract bridge begins with the dealer and proceeds
clockwise around the table.
This observation, then, lends prima facie credibility to the analysis. I cannot go
into an extended evaluation of this issue here. However, IF the Krifka-style analy-
sis presented above is correct, then a notion of domain restriction is a fundamental
part of the analysis of generics, and not something occasionally layered on top.
If we think of domain restriction as the setting aside of contrary or possibly
even irrelevant cases, the Krifka-type analysis actually encodes three layers of
such restriction in the analysis—two besides the presence of the restrictor clause.
The first is the character of the GEN operator itself, which is characterized as
'default quantification'. I have misgivings about the 'quantification' part (a
purely extensional notion), but the idea of defaults that can be overriden with
more specific information as basic to the analysis of generics is an extremely per-
sistent one; indeed, it would never occur to a person to invent defaults if one only
dealt with episodic sentences, which are relentlessly monotonic. There are of
course numerous proposals about how to model this phenomenon using non-
monotonic devices (e.g., Asher and Morreau, 1995), and quite differing conceptu-
alizations of it, but what seems to be common to all is that of more specific infor-
mation overriding conflicting more general information. In this way, the GEN op-
erator sets aside exceptions not already excluded from the domain, 'from the in-
side' instead of 'from the outside', as a restrictor clause might.
Then there is the third restrictive mechanism aside from GEN and restrictor
clauses corresponding to sentential constituents: the 'background' situation-type
B. This is intended to be a conversational background of the type proposed by
Kratzer 1981 for the analysis of modals, and little more is said about it. Here is an
example drawn from Krifka of how it is to operate. Take a sentence like (7):
(7) Pheasants lay speckled eggs.
The restrictor clause here only contains the information that the situation has
pheasants in it. To say that any such situation is extendable to one where each
pheasant in that situation is laying a speckled egg is clearly wrong. But a back-
ground type of situation B, in which the domain is restricted to just those cases
where something is giving birth, will combine to achieve near-universality in this
case, leaving the default nature of GEN to get rid of weird pheasants laying al-
bino eggs and whatnot; this is all very plausible, but badly underspecified.
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Summarizing the strategy, then, what one does is to attempt eliminate excep-
tions in three steps: first, by finding a focused portion of the sentence which ex-
presses the content of the restrictor and limiting consideration to just those types
of situations; next, you invoke a general background to remove a lot of further
cases; and finally the default character of the GEN operator will dispose of the
residue. What remains is a domain where universal closure holds. We can summa-




4. Some possible sources of background restriction
The success or failure of this strategy has yet to be seen, but it also leaves very
serious questions about its viability in all aspects. But I am most concerned with
the use of B. Unless this is somehow constrained, so that one does not posit
whatever one wishes at any given time, the consequence would appear to be that
nearly any generic would come out true on a given reading. I don't think this is
the result we want. Nevertheless, it is clear that a number of other covert restric-
tive phenomena occur, and what I'd like to do is briefly survey some instances
and then come around to a reconsideration of B.
I've already noted the appearance of domain adverbs. However, it is evident
that implicit domain restrictions are even more pervasive, fixed by the context
under which an utterance takes place. Consider example sentence (8):
(8) Coffee and muffins are served around 9 AM.
Such examples as this contrast with sentences like 'The sun rises in the East'.
One would readily agree that the sun does in fact rise in the East. But if asked to
evaluate the truth or falsity of sentence (8), it seems that one would seek to know
the circumstances of the utterance of sentence (8) in order to answer. In a given
context, such as in discussing the local customs, or receiving information from a
hotel clerk when checking in, the domain of generalization is implicitly restricted
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by our understanding of the discourse, to (e.g.) activities located in the culture
under discussion, or those located in that hotel.
Let us call this 'implicit pragmatic restriction'. Such restrictions may be im-
posed indexically, such as by the time and place of utterance. The generic utter-
ance 'Oh, it usually snows heavily during the winter', for example, is most often
understood as restricted to the general area where the utterance is made (though .
of course other restrictions are possible). Or, the discourse itself might explicitly I
introduce domain restrictions in one sentence that are understood as carrying
through in subsequent discourse. Consider the interpretation of the last sentence
in this short discourse:
(9) In Latin, Izl between vowels is pronounced as [r]. But [z] never occurs
word-finally.
Clearly, the last statement is understood as restricted to Latin, in light of the pre-
vious sentence. I do not even wish to suppose that implicit pragmatic restriction is
a unified phenomenon; it could quite easily arise in a number of distinct ways.
Probably of more linguistic interest are those cases of implicit restrictions
that arise from the meanings and implicatures associated with expressions that
overtly appear in the sentence itself. Conversational Implicatures can, it would
appear, give rise to implicit domain restrictions. Consider the following example
suggested to me by Rich Thomason.
(10) People have a hard time finding CMU (= Carnegie Mellon University).
Let us assume, as seems correct, that the restrictor is merely the subject NP people.
Now, by far and away, most people have never had, or ever will have, a hard time
finding CMU. Or, if we implicitly restrict our attention just to those instances
when people are going to CMU, we see that in nearly all those instances people
find it with ease (e.g., most trips are by students, faculty, staff, nearby residents,
etc.). From this perspective, it leaves one wondering what on earth (10) is a gen-
eralization over. However, if we take into account the conversational implicatures
associated with the locution 'have a hard time x-ing', then this appears to be a
much more normal type of generalization. Let us take two examples. First, I ap-
proach my neighbor Jim who has never been to CMU and has no intention of
ever going there; I ask, 'Did you have a hard time find CMU?' The result is infe-
licity because it implicates that he at some time was trying to find CMU. This infe-
licity then rules Jim out of the domain. Next, I approach Bob Carpenter, who used
to work at CMU, and knowing this and knowing he went there today I ask him, *
'Did you have a hard time finding CMU?' Again, the result is infelicity, this time
because it appears to implicate that I had some reason to believe Bob has man-
aged to forget where CMU is, and Bob is much sharper than that.
Under what circumstances is the locution used felicitously, then? Clearly, in
those cases where (a) the person was in fact trying to find CMU, and (b) where
the speaker has reason to think that the hearer is not familiar with the area. If one
restricts the generalization, then, to just those circumstances, sentence (10) ap-
pears to be a much more normal type of generalization. The source of the implicit
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restriction (if this account is correct) is not the truth-conditional semantics of the
utterance, but rather implicatures associated with the utterance in context.
Presuppositions of lexical items may also drive implicit restrictions. Consider
the following example, from Schubert and Pelletier 1987:
(11) Cats land on their feet.
The lexical semantics of the verb 'land' requires that immediately before the
landing, the subject is airborne (and traveling in the direction of the ground, per-
haps). This restricts the cats under consideration to those that are airborne, and
not those sitting on my kitchen counter, etc.
Implicit restrictions may also arise from other semantic sources in the sen-
tence. Consider the following sentence also taken from Schubert and Pelletier
1987, of a type considered in greater detail in von Fintel (1994) and elsewhere.
(12) Bullfighters are often injured.
The issue here is the implicit restriction on the range of the adverbial often, on the
more salient interpretation where it appears to mean that bullfighters are often
injured when bullfighting. There is a much more wide-ranging possibility com-
patible with no bullring injuries, but a lot of motocycle accidents involving bull-
fighters. But on the more salient reading, the introduction of the 'when bull-
fighting' restriction comes from the fact that bullfighters is in the sentence, and
bullfighting is the fundamental activity one must engage in in order to be a bull-
fighter. If the sentence instead read, 'Policemen are often injured', obviously
there would be no inclination whatsoever, out of context, to implicitly restrict this
to just those cases of policemen engaged IN bullfighting, but rather to activities
connected to police work instead.
Another case of implicit restriction derived from the meaning of the consi-
tuents of proposition expressed is exemplified in (13).
(13) Bishops move diagonally.
If one observes all the cases of real-world motion of chess bishops, one would
find their movements approximate that of nearly any other chess piece—being
carted about in cars, carried in boxes to the park, sent flying to the ground in self-
indulgent fits of frustration, etc. However, all such movements of this type would
appear to be outside the implicit domain. What this means, of course, is that these
chess pieces move diagonally, as 'move', 'diagonally', and indeed 'bishop' are
defined in chess. Although each of these words has a more general 'real-world'
sense, the particular senses taken on here are those derived from the constitutive
rules of chess, so that the only activities that count as within the implicit domain
here are those instances of bona fide chess-playing. Thus, a body of constitutive
rules (see Searle 1969) defining the senses of terms used in the sentence can be
used to form another implicit domain. As with example (12) above, this implicit
restriction may or may not take place in a given instance. Imagine, for instance,
someone only vaguely familiar with the game of chess is told the following:
(14) Bishops are made of wood, metal, ivory, or plastic.
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One might not know whether this is a 'real-world' generalization (which at least I
think it is), or whether this is implicitly restricted to the game of chess (and as such
would take on a definitional air, as it seems to when the explicit domain adverb
'in chess' is added).
So, it seems clear that a number of different sources of implicit domain restric-
tions on the applicability of generics can be proposed with considerable initial
plausibility. However, in the absence of a reasonable understanding of how these 4
restrictions are identified and intergrated with the interpretation of the sentence,
we cannot evaluate the hypothesis that the domains can be so narrowly restricted
as to result in universality of application as the final result. Put otherwise, the goal
of reduction to the universal drives the very plausibility of these explanations.
But which (if any) are correct?
The all-too-handy nature of these constraints to the working semanticist
must at some point meet with some empirical motivation. One plausible assump-
tion to make is we take Krifka's background set of information B as a part of that
set of information that is incremented by utterances in a discourse, in line with
Stalnaker 1978, taking B, among other things, also to restrict pronoun reference
and the domain of quantification. Thus, B by definition carries over from sentence
to sentence in a discourse in the same way as presuppositions may, being a prop-
erty of discourse and not sentences (this does not mean that it cannot be can-
celled, of course).
In sum, what is being proposed is that 'background information' accounts
of restrictions on the domain of generics must withstand the test of reference re-
strictions and domain of quantification restrictions; if one cannot find evidence of
such restrictions, then one's theory of genericity cannot posit a putative property
(set of circumstances, or whatever) as a restriction on the domain of applicability.
We are not here going to complete the forbidding exercise of evaluating all
the conceivable proposals based on these empirical assumptions. However, let us
examine a couple of contrasting examples. Consider a sentence such as the fol-
lowing:
(15) Pheasants lay speckled eggs.
Here, on one story, we decide we're really only talking about (normal adult) fe-
male pheasants engaged in birthing.
Now, consider example (16)
(16) Pheasants lay speckled eggs. Once rare, they now number in the mil- I
lions.
The question is whether they in (16) can be understood as referring exclusively
to (birthing) female pheasants or whether it can be understood as only ranging
over all pheasants. It appears the latter is correct: they must be understood as re-
ferring to the kind pheasants, unrestricted by gender. Or, consider (17)
(17) Pheasants lay speckled eggs; every pheasant is illegal to hunt.
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The question here is whether every pheasant can be understood as quantifying
over females only. On the assumption that males alone are legel prey for hunters
(females being off limits), the second sentence in (17) ought to be understood as
stating something true. But it does not, because every pheasant seems to have
to range overall members of that type, not some restricted portion of them.
This situation should be contrasted with the case of indexical or pragmatic
restrictions of the sort illustrated in (8) repeated here:
(8) Coffee and muffins are served around 9 AM.
Let us imagine the context is where a hotel clerk is giving a guest information
about dining opportuinities. The continuations in (19) are all easily interpretable
as having reference restricted to coffee and muffins in the context.
(19) a. Every muffin comes with a cherry on top. (= muffins served here)
b. Every cup of coffee is made by a special method. (= cups of cof-
fee served here)
c. It is generally Colombian coffee.(= coffee served here)
d. They are baked in our own ovens. (= muffins served here)
If this is correct, and if intuition bears up, it shows that pragmatic restrictions of
the sort noted in (8) can be part of B, but that a 'female pheasant' or 'pheasant
giving birth' restriction must take place through other mechanisms if it is to take
place at all: using B for this purpose cannot be sustained.
It is of course quite possible that there can be a fourth type of restriction
added to the three that are motivated, on independent grounds, by Krifka. But
until adequate motivation for yet another mechanism is introduced, one must
conclude that the strategy of reduction-to-the-universal has yet to prove itself an
attainable goal.
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